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THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL ADVICE:
ELIMINATING THE FALSE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN BROKERS AND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS
CHRISTINE LAZARO†
The individuals who effectuate securities transactions and
offer financial advice to the public are regulated at several
levels—by federal statute, by state law, and by rules of federal
regulators, including the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and self-regulatory organizations. Following the stock
market crash of 1929, Congress began to enact a federal
framework of regulation of the securities markets and the
individuals working within the securities markets. Initially,
Congress focused on brokers, the individuals who were paid to
effectuate securities transactions.1 Next, Congress focused on
investment advisers, the individuals who were paid for the advice
they gave in connection with securities transactions.2
The SEC is responsible for implementing the regulatory
schemes for both brokers and investment advisers. The SEC
directly regulates investment advisers.3 Brokers are indirectly
regulated by the SEC and primarily regulated by the Financial
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Acting Director of the Securities Arbitration Clinic at St. John’s University
School of Law. I would like to thank Teresa Grogan and Mark Movsesian for their
helpful comments and Adam Heckler, J.D., 2012, St. John’s University School of
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1
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012); Thomas Lee Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties
and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 47, 50 (2011).
2
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2012); Hazen, supra note 1.
3
See James T. Koebel, Trust and the Investment Adviser Industry: Congress’
Failure To Realize FINRA’s Potential To Restore Investor Confidence, 35 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 61, 64–65 (2010); Ross Jordan, Note, Thinking Before Rulemaking:
Why the SEC Should Think Twice Before Imposing a Uniform Fiduciary Standard
on Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 491, 494–95
(2012).
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Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), one of the selfregulatory organizations for which the SEC has oversight
responsibility.4
The regulatory schemes associated with the SEC and FINRA
are separate and distinct. The standard of care applicable to
brokers is limited in scope and time to the transaction they are
effectuating.5 Pursuant to rules promulgated by FINRA, brokers
must make suitable recommendations to their clients, execute
orders promptly, disclose certain material information, charge
prices reasonably related to the prevailing market, and fully
disclose any conflict of interest.6 Brokers are not fiduciaries of
their clients and their duties to their clients end once the
transaction is completed.7 Brokers have no obligation to provide
any ongoing advice to their clients nor are they obligated to
monitor their clients’ accounts.8 Brokers are obligated to observe
high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade.9 On the other hand, investment advisers are
held to a higher standard of care. Investment advisers are
deemed fiduciaries and are expected to act in their clients’ best
interests at all times.10 The advice they give is ongoing and,
accordingly, the standard of care applicable to their interactions
with their clients is ongoing.11 Investment advisers are expected
to monitor their clients’ accounts and provide advice as
appropriate.12
Over time, the distinctions between brokers and investment
advisers have blurred. Effectuating transactions and offering
advice are no longer distinct activities conducted by different
individuals. Brokers offer advice and seek compensation for the

4

See Koebel, supra note 3; Jordan, supra note 3.
See Jordan, supra note 3, at 501.
6
See id. at 501–02.
7
See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 716, 719, 726–27 (2010) [hereinafter Laby, Fiduciary
Obligations].
8
See id. at 728.
9
FINRA Rule 2010 (2008), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/
display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=5504.
10
See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 718; Jordan, supra note 3,
at 502–03.
11
See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 728.
12
Id.
5
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advice they give to clients.13 Aware that brokers were beginning
to conduct activities which might bring them under the purview
of the regulations governing investment advisers, the SEC
attempted to carve out exceptions to the regulations for brokers.14
However, the SEC has been unsuccessful in this regard when
challenged in court.15 Now, an individual offering financial
advice may be both a broker and an investment adviser and offer
different levels of service to different clients. This individual will
be governed by the regulations associated with brokers when
acting in the capacity of a broker and will be governed by the
regulations associated with investment advisers when acting in
the capacity of an investment adviser.16 This has blurred the
distinctions even further, as the same person may be both.17
Concerned that the distinctions between brokers and
investment advisers have blurred too far, a number of studies,
including several commissioned by the SEC, have examined an
investor’s comprehension of the distinctions. The studies have
consistently demonstrated that investors do not understand the
different roles of brokers and investment advisers.18 Investors do
not understand that the conduct of brokers and investment
advisers are governed by different regulatory schemes and by
different standards of care.19 Investors do not always understand
with whom they are doing business.20
The SEC was not the only entity concerned that the
investing public may not understand who is offering them advice
and what responsibilities attach to such individuals. In 2010, as
part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Congress decided to take a closer
look at the legislation and regulations governing the
relationships between brokers and investment advisers and their
13
See Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 400–01 (2009) [hereinafter Laby, Reforming
the Regulation].
14
See id. at 403.
15
See Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Laby,
Reforming the Regulation, supra note 13, at 410–12.
16
See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 715.
17
See id.
18
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND
BROKER-DEALERS i (2011), [hereinafter SEC STUDY], available at http://www.sec.gov
/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
19
See id.
20
See id.
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clients.21 As a result, it tasked the SEC with examining this
relationship and determining if any action need be taken.22 The
SEC completed a comprehensive study that examined these
issues and made recommendations (the “Study”).23
The Study issued by the staff of the SEC recognized that
there is widespread confusion among investors about both the
differences between brokers and investment advisers and the
differing standards of liability that are applicable to each.24 As a
result, the Study recommended harmonizing the standards
applicable to brokers and investment advisers when providing
personalized investment advice about securities.25 However, the
Study specifically did not advocate adopting a standard for
brokers that would be ongoing.26 The standard of care proposed
would still be limited in time.27 Accordingly, it would not mirror
the scope of the standard applicable to investment advisers.
Rather than adopt the recommendations proposed by the
SEC, this Article proposes that the best course of action at this
point is to adopt new legislation—a Financial Advice Act. While
the distinctions between brokers and investment advisers have
blurred, there remain distinctions. A one-size-fits-all regulatory
structure will disregard the realities of the marketplace.
Different clients have different needs and expectations from their
financial professionals and want different fee structures which
reflect the different services. Accordingly, the Financial Advice
Act would not harmonize the standards applicable to brokers and
investment advisers.
It would eliminate the artificial
distinctions between brokers and investment advisers as they
now exist, and replace them with new definitions more closely
tied to the services actually offered by the financial professional.
It would recognize that there are varying levels of financial
advice with different compensation associated with them. It
would create standards of care that are more closely related to
the advice and the expectations created by the financial
professional. Clients would have the option of choosing to do
21
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010).
22
See id. at 182427.
23
See generally SEC STUDY, supra note 18.
24
See id. at 101.
25
See id. at 132.
26
Id. at 165–66.
27
Id.
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business with a full range of financial professionals from discount
to full service, and would receive a corresponding level of
protection.
In order to set the stage for the discussion of this Article’s
proposal, this Article first examines the legislative history of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, and second, the judicial history of both.
The
circumstances in which each Act was formed explain why the
Acts were initially distinct and inform the discussion of why
those distinctions are no longer applicable. Next, this Article
examines how the SEC has attempted to deal with the blurring
of the distinctions in a way that would permit the financial
professionals to offer various advice models to clients. By
ensuring that there remain definable distinctions between
brokers and investment advisers, the courts have further blurred
the landscape.
Next this Article examines Congress’s attempt to deal with
this blurring of roles, and the effect Dodd-Frank has had on this
landscape. It will explore the Study conducted by the SEC
pursuant to Dodd-Frank and the recommendations made by the
staff of the SEC. Lastly, this Article will describe a proposal for a
new securities act, which would modify the existing legislation in
such a way to eliminate the artificial distinctions between
brokers and investment advisers.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACTS FOR
BROKERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS

In order to comprehensively evaluate the weaknesses in the
current regulatory structure governing the provision of financial
advice, it is important to understand the environment in which
the applicable statutes were initially enacted. Prior to the
enactment of federal securities laws, the offering of securities
was governed by the states or by stock exchanges.28 It was not
until the early part of the twentieth century that investments in
securities became widespread to the general public.29

28
Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and
Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 794–95
(2004).
29
Id. at 778.
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During World War I, the U.S. Government began offering
Liberty Bonds, creating a broad public interest in securities.30
Following the War, the 1920s were a boom period in the United
States, during which time an “unhealthy volume of credit was
sucked into securities markets to the deprivation of agriculture,
commerce, and industry,” causing widespread securities
inflation.31
The post-war boom in stocks also attracted . . . the attention of
private individuals who up to that time had been more likely to
put their funds in savings banks, mortgages, local investments,
the managers of which they knew personally, or which were
such a factor in their surroundings, their neighborhood, that
they felt some confidence in them.32

By 1934, “nearly one half of the entire national wealth of the
country [was] represented by corporate stocks and corporate and
Government bonds”; however, “nearly one half of that corporate
wealth [was] vested in the 200 largest nonbanking
corporations.”33 Corporate ownership was now vested in the
hands of a large number of investors, separating ownership of the
corporations from control of the corporations. It was estimated
that more than “10,000,000 individual men and women in the
United States [were] the direct possessors of stocks and bonds.”34
As more money went into the securities markets, the value of
stocks increased, creating a bubble that inevitably burst in
October 1929. “The market value of all stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange slumped from $89,000,000,000 on
September 1, 1929, to $15,000,000,000 on July 1, 1932,”35 a drop
of more than eighty percent. Throughout this time period, it was
clear that securities markets were occupying a much more
significant place in the day-to-day workings of the country, yet
there was little to no oversight. This had to change.
Stock exchanges which handle the distribution and trading of a
very substantial part of the entire national wealth and which
have developed a technique of sucking funds from every corner
of the country cannot operate under the same traditions and

30
31
32
33
34
35

Id. at 796.
S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3 (1934).
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INV. TRUSTS AND INV. COS. 4 (1939).
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 3 (1934).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3.
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practices as pre-war stock exchanges which handled
substantially only the transactions of professional investors and
speculators.36

Following the crash of the stock market in 1929, Congress
examined the lack of oversight of the securities industry.
Initially, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933.37 This
statute has two primary goals: (1) to ensure that investors
receive full disclosure in connection with securities being offered
for public sale; and (2) to prohibit fraud in connection with the
sale of securities.38 The Act focuses primarily on the issuance of
securities. Because the Act does not deal with the oversight of
brokers or investment advisers, this Act will not be discussed in
this Article. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 would deal
with the secondary markets in which securities trade.
A.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934

As the country delved further into the Great Depression,
President Roosevelt tasked Congress with enacting legislation
“providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the
operations of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for
the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of values,
and . . . for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and
destructive speculation.”39 In response, Congress adopted the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”).40
The 1934 Act was proposed to combat the issues coming out
of the Great Depression. The cure had to be widespread if there
was any possibility of it being effective.
“Speculation,
manipulation, faulty credit control, investors’ ignorance, and
disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law should
regard as fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web. No one of
these evils can be isolated for cure of itself alone.”41 The 1934 Act
was meant to deal with three principal problems: (1) “the
excessive use of credit for speculation,” (2) “the unfair practices

36

H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 4.
See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74.
38
The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last modified Oct. 1, 2013).
39
S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 2 (1934).
40
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78pp (2012).
41
H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 6.
37
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employed in speculation,” and (3) “the secrecy surrounding the
financial condition of corporations which invite the public to
purchase their securities.”42
Congress was concerned primarily with two practices of
brokers. The first was the extension of margin credit.43 Brokers
were lending their clients’ money, which they had borrowed from
a bank or another broker, so that their clients could speculate in
the market.
The ease and celerity with which such a transaction is
arranged, and the absence of any scrutiny by the broker of the
personal credit of the borrower, encourage the purchase of
securities by persons with insufficient resources to protect their
accounts in the event of a decline in the value of the securities
purchased.44

The second concern was the commingling of broker and
dealer functions.45
[A] broker who deals in securities for his own account finds it
difficult to give disinterested advice to a customer with regard
to the securities the customer seeks to buy. However honest the
broker’s intentions may be, it is argued that he should be placed
beyond temptation, by a complete segregation of the broker and
dealer functions.46

However, the committee declined to take such action. Instead,
the committee recommended that one situation in which broker
and dealer functions were combined should be eliminated.47 The
committee recommended prohibiting a broker from effecting “any
transaction involving the sale on margin, of a security in the
distribution of which he has participated during the preceding 6
months.”48 Additionally, the proposed bill required brokers to
disclose in writing to their customers any interest the broker had
in the transaction.49

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5.
Id. at 6–7.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
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The 1934 Act created the Securities and Exchange
Commission.50 The SEC was created so that there would be
flexibility in the implementation of the statute.
Congress
recognized,
so delicate a mechanism as the modern stock exchange cannot
be regulated efficiently under a rigid statutory program. Unless
considerable latitude is allowed for the exercise of
administrative discretion, it is impossible to avoid, on the one
hand, unworkable ‘strait-jacket’ regulation and, on the other,
loopholes which may be penetrated by slight variations in the
method of doing business. Accordingly it is essential to entrust
the administration of the act to an agency vested with power to
eliminate undue hardship and to prevent and punish evasion.51

Throughout the 1934 Act, the SEC is empowered with the
ability to create rules that would govern how the 1934 Act is
implemented.52
The 1934 Act contains a broad antifraud
provision, which provides the following:53
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities
exchange[]
....
(b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.54

The wording of the statute is broad and leaves the SEC with
the responsibility to develop rules and regulations defining the
conduct it deems unacceptable. The SEC in turn promulgated
Rule 10b-5, which broadly prohibits fraud in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities.55
50

15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).
S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5 (1934).
52
See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013) (“The Act
empowers the SEC with broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry.”).
53
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
54
Id.
55
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). Rule 10b-5 states the following:
51
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The 1934 Act also gave the SEC broad authority over the
securities industry, including the power to “register, regulate,
and oversee brokerage firms”56 as well as brokers. Under the
1934 Act, a broker is defined as “any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others.”57 In 1938, the Maloney Act amended the 1934 Act to
provide for a system of self-regulation of brokerage firms.58 The
section permitted the registration of an association of brokers
and dealers as a national securities association.59 Only one such
association has ever registered pursuant to this section—the
National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), which is
today known as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.60
Under the watch of the SEC, FINRA has the primary
responsibility of regulating brokers and writing and enforcing
rules for every broker in the United States.61

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
56

The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 38.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
58
See id. § 78o-3.
59
Id. § 78o-3(a).
60
In 2007, FINRA was created through the consolidation of NASD and the
member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration operations of the New York Stock
Exchange. Press Release, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine To Form
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority—FINRA, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.
(July 30, 2007), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/
P036329. Today, it is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing
business in the United States, and it oversees over 4,000 brokerage firms and over
600,000 registered securities representatives. About the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., http://www.finra.org/
AboutFINRA/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
61
GET TO KNOW US, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (2012), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/documents/corporate/p1186
67.pdf.
57
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The Investment Advisers Act of 1940

Congress was not finished when it enacted the 1934 Act,
however. It continued to evaluate the securities markets to
determine whether additional legislation was necessary. In
1939, the SEC submitted a report to Congress on Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies.62
As discussed above,
following World War I, stock ownership had become more
widespread. Consequentially, a need for investment counsel
arose.63 Very few investment counselor firms existed prior to
1919. Investors had other sources of advice available to them,
and a number were
completely satisfied with the fact that they were being given
competent and sound advice by the investment banking houses.
The brokers were more of a secondary source of advice, while
the banking houses knew quite a bit about bonds and not so
much as a rule about stocks, the brokers knew more about
stocks and very little about bonds insofar as their function was
concerned. Their attention was centered on the more active
stocks, per se, to some extent.64

It was recognized that although many different sources of advice
existed, there was “no one to whom [an investor] could turn and
retain professionally the way he would retain a lawyer on a
technical problem where he was up against technical men on the
other side who knew more than he did.”65
Issues arose, because at this point, investment counselors
were not regulated broadly. There were a handful of small
organizations that investment counselors could join; however,
there was no requirement that an investment counselor be a
member of any organization.66 The standards were disparate,
“[a]lthough in the majority of cases the personnel of investment
counsel firms had had some experience in the security brokerage
business or in the financial field, definite or uniform standards of
62
See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES: REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 30 OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935 (1939).
63
Throughout the SEC’s report, the term “investment counselor” was used.
However, in the Act, this term was replaced with “investment adviser.” For clarity
purposes, this Article will use the term “investment counselor” when referring to the
SEC’s report.
64
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 62, at 3.
65
Id. at 4–5.
66
Id. at 4.
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training for employees were almost never laid down.”67 As a
result, “individuals without the requisite qualifications and
financial responsibility who indulged in exaggerated claims
constituted a menace not only to the investor but to the
counselors.”68
Representatives of investment counselors recognized that
their function was the “furnishing to clients on a personal basis
competent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the sound
management of their investments” and they could not do this
“unless all conflicts of interest between the investment counsel
and the client were removed.”69 One such conflict arose from the
intermingling of functions between investment counselors and
brokers. Investment counselors were concerned that affiliations
between investment counselor firms and brokers
fostered undesirable and irreconcilable conflicts of interest, for
“the broker receives his income principally or entirely from the
commissions received on transactions—the larger the number of
transactions the larger his gross income” and “the broker’s
interest in turnover might be a temptation to advise clients to
trade more than might be to their advantage or than might be
necessary in their interest.”70

The report provided by the SEC demonstrated the need for
the adoption of legislation aimed at regulating investment
counselors.
Accordingly, in 1940, Congress adopted the
Investment Advisers Act (the “Advisers Act”).71 “The nature of
the functions of investment advisers, their increasing widespread
activities, their potential influence on security markets and the
dangerous potentialities of stock market tipsters imposing upon
unsophisticated investors, convinces this committee that
protection of investors requires the regulation of investment
advisers on a national scale.”72
The Advisers Act requires that firms or individuals who
provide investment advice must register with the SEC.73 The
Advisers Act defines an investment adviser as

67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id. at 16.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29 (footnote omitted).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 (2012).
S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 21 (1940).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3.
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any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities.74

Specifically exempted from the definition of investment adviser is
“any broker or dealer whose performance of such services is
solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or
dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor.”75
Like the 1934 Act, the Advisers Act prohibits fraud and
deceptive practices on the part of an investment adviser. Unlike
the 1934 Act, the Advisers Act is more explicit in the conduct it
prohibits:76
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
directly or indirectly—
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any
client or prospective client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or
prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any
security to or purchase any security from a client, or acting as
broker for a person other than such client, knowingly to effect
any sale or purchase of any security for the account of such
client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the
completion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting
and obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction. The
prohibitions of this paragraph shall not apply to any transaction
with a customer of a broker or dealer if such broker or dealer is
not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such
transaction; or
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall,
for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by rules and regulations
define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent,
such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.77
74
75
76
77

Id. § 80b-2(a)(11).
Id. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
Id. § 80b-6.
Id.
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Unlike the 1934 Act, the Advisers Act does not leave it to the
SEC to define the conduct it deems unacceptable.78 The SEC,
however, does have the authority to enact rules governing
investment advisers and has the primary responsibility for
regulating the conduct of investment advisers.79
II. THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACTS FOR
BROKERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS
The standards of care, which were set forth by both the 1934
Act and the Advisers Act, were not clear. Although both statutes
contain separate antifraud provisions, the courts have
interpreted each provision differently. This has led to disparities
in the obligations of brokers and investment advisers, even
though both statutes aimed to prevent fraudulent conduct. Over
time, courts interpreted the antifraud section of the Advisers Act
to establish a federal fiduciary duty on the part of investment
advisers, while the antifraud section of the 1934 Act was said to
have established no such duty on the part of brokers.80
To determine the standard of care associated with each Act,
the courts considered the level of scienter necessary to find a
violation of each Act’s antifraud provision.81 In 1963, the
Supreme Court considered the relationship between an
investment adviser and a client, and concluded that the
relationship was fiduciary in nature.82 Justice Goldberg, writing
for the majority, stated,
And the Committee Reports indicate a desire to preserve ‘the
personalized character of the services of investment advisers,’
and to eliminate conflicts of interest between the investment
adviser and the clients as safeguards both to ‘unsophisticated
investors’ and to ‘bona fide investment counsel.’
The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional
recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment

78

See id.
Id. § 80b-11.
80
Compare SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191
(1963) (holding that under the Advisers Act, a relationship between an investment
advisor and a client is fiduciary in nature), with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (holding that scienter is a necessary element of the antifraud
section of the 1934 Act and therefore it does not confer a fiduciary duty on brokers).
81
See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193; Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
at 191–92.
82
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191.
79
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advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to
eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which
might incline as investment adviser—consciously or
unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested. It
would defeat the manifest purpose of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 for us to hold, therefore, that Congress, in
empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates ‘as
a fraud or deceit,’ intended to require proof of intent to injure
and actual injury to clients.83

In considering a breach of this fiduciary duty, the Court
determined that the motivation of the investment adviser was
not relevant.84 “It misconceives the purpose of the statute to
confine its application to ‘dishonest’ as opposed to ‘honest’
motives.”85
With respect to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the courts have
determined that, because scienter is a necessary element to find
a violation of the section, the section does not confer a fiduciary
duty on brokers.86 As explained by the Supreme Court, “Section
10(b) makes unlawful the use or employment of ‘any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ in contravention
of Commission rules. The words ‘manipulative or deceptive’ used
in conjunction with ‘device or contrivance’ strongly suggest that
[section] 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
conduct.”87
The Court also considered whether or not Rule 10b-5 may
cover negligent acts, determining that it could not.88 The Court
recognized that Rule 10b-5 was enacted by the SEC pursuant to
authority granted to it by section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.89 “Thus
despite the broad view of the Rule advanced by the Commission
in this case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the
Commission by Congress under [section] 10(b).”90 Accordingly,
both section 10(b), and Rule 10b-5 require a finding of scienter,
foreclosing liability for negligent violation of either.

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 191–92.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 201 (footnotes omitted).
See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 214.
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In addition to the scope of the standard of care an
investment adviser owes a client, the recourse available to clients
for a violation of the standard is also an important consideration.
In 1979, the Court revisited the issues regarding the standards of
care applicable to investment advisers when it determined
whether or not Congress intended investors to have a private
right of action for violations of the Advisers Act.91 The Court
recognized that section 206 of the Advisers Act “establishes
‘federal fiduciary standards’ to govern the conduct of investment
advisers.”92 Notwithstanding the broad purposes of investor
protection which were behind each of the securities acts enacted
following the Great Depression, the Court determined that
investors did not have the right to pursue monetary damages
under the statute beyond that contemplated by section 215.93
The Court held “that when Congress declared in § 215 that
certain contracts are void, it intended that the customary legal
incidents of voidness would follow, including the availability of a
suit for rescission or for an injunction against continued
operation of the contract, and for restitution.”94 However, the
Court found that Congress had failed to clearly express an
intended private right of action for violations of section 206.95
Accordingly, the Court held that “there exists a limited private
remedy under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to void an
investment advisers contract, but that the Act confers no other
private causes of action, legal or equitable.”96
The courts have found, however, that investors do have a
private right of action for violations of section 10(b),
notwithstanding that it contains no explicit assertion of such a
right. The Court has recognized that
[a]lthough [section] 10(b) does not by its terms create an express
civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that
Congress, or the Commission when adopting Rule 10b-5,
contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of
action for violations of the statute and the Rule is now well
established.97
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 12–13 (1979).
Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 24.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
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In a later case, the Court explained further that “[j]udicial
interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the
passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of
action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and
constitutes an essential tool for enforcement of the 1934 Act’s
requirements.”98 With respect to section 10(b), the Court was
more concerned with the intent of the wrongdoer than it was
when dealing with investment advisers, even though the
legislative history of the 1934 Act barely discussed the scope of
10(b). The Court reasoned,
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is
bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress’ intent, we think
the relevant portions of that history support our conclusion that
[section] 10(b) was addressed to practices that involve some
element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for
negligent conduct alone.99

III. REGULATORY CHANGES TO THE SECURITIES ACTS
The differing standards of care applicable to brokers and
investment advisers took on greater significance over time.
When the Advisers Act was enacted, it was accepted that brokers
would not be covered by the Act, even though they did offer some
advice to customers. At the time, the SEC’s General Counsel
offered his opinion on the topic:
Clause (C) of Section 202(a)(11) amounts to a recognition that
brokers and dealers commonly give a certain amount of advice
to their customers in the course of their regular business, and
that it would be inappropriate to bring them within the scope of
the Investment Advisers Act merely because of this aspect of
their business. On the other hand, that portion of clause (C)
which refers to ‘special compensation’ amounts to an equally
clear recognition that a broker or dealer who is specially
compensated for the rendition of advice should be considered an
investment adviser and not be excluded from the purview of the
Act merely because he is also engaged in effecting market
transactions in securities.100

98

Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988).
Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201.
100
Opinion of General Counsel Relating to Section 202(a)(11)(c), Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 2, 1940 WL 975 (Oct. 28, 1940).
99
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Usually, a broker is paid a fee for each transaction placed
and an investment adviser is paid a management fee, which is a
percentage of the assets managed.101 The investment adviser’s
fee is related to the advice and management provided whereas
the broker’s fee is related to the costs of transacting the trades.102
The distinctions in the fee structures made it clear that one fee
structure was directly related to advice and the other was related
to transaction costs. Over time, brokers expanded the services
and fee structures they offered their clients, offering fee-based
programs and self-directed accounts which had discounted fees.103
Through the fee-based programs, brokers offered investors “a
package of brokerage services—including execution, investment
advice, custodial and recordkeeping services—for a fixed fee or a
fee based on the amount of assets on account with the brokerdealer.”104 The self-directed accounts allowed investors to
purchas[e] execution-only services at a reduced commission
rate. These execution-only programs often give customers the
ability to trade securities over the Internet without the
assistance of a registered representative. These programs offer
customers who do not want or need investment advice the
ability to trade securities at a lower commission rate.105

Therefore, brokers were offering their clients fee-based programs,
transaction-based fee structures in which the client received
personalized investment advice, and self-directed account
services where the client paid discounted transaction-based fees.
The new fee-based programs offered by brokers blurred the
correlation between fees and advice. It was no longer clear what
brokers were charging for when they charged clients an assetbased fee. The SEC was concerned that the new fee structures
offered would bring brokers under the purview of the Advisers
Act. The SEC recognized that fees earned in fee-based accounts
might constitute “special compensation” for advice under the

101

See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 7, at 702 (“Advisory
firms . . . typically charge asset-based fees . . . .”); Barbara Black, Brokers and
Dealers—What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 35–38 (2005).
102
See Black, supra note 101.
103
See id. at 31–32.
104
Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Release No.
34-42099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226-01, at
61,228 (proposed Nov. 10, 1999).
105
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Advisers Act.106 Further, offering discount services might make
the fees received in connection with full service accounts “special
compensation.”107 “This is because the difference between full
service and execution-only commission rates represents a clearly
definable portion of a brokerage commission that is attributable,
at least in part, to investment advice.”108 However, the SEC did
not believe
that Congress intended these programs, which are not
substantially
different
from
traditional
brokerage
arrangements, to be subject to the Act. While in 1940 the form
of compensation a broker-dealer received may have been a
reliable distinction between brokerage and advisory services,
development of the new brokerage programs suggest strongly
that it is no longer.109

The SEC saw the various fee structures as flexibility in the way
brokers did business—not necessarily as a change in the type of
advice brokers offered their clients.
If brought under the Advisers Act, brokers would be held to
the federal fiduciary duty of investment advisers and would be
subject to certain other restrictions that the Act imposes.
Specifically, section 206(3) of the Advisers Act prohibits an
investment adviser from acting as a principal for his own account
“without disclosing to such client in writing before the completion
of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and
obtaining the consent of the client to such transaction.”110 The
practice of acting as a principal on his own account is
commonplace for brokers and may be disclosed at the completion
of the trade.111 There is no requirement to disclose such
information before the completion of the transaction, nor is there
any requirement to obtain the consent of the client.112
Restricting brokers in this way would impact the services they
traditionally offered their clients.
Fearing that brokers would be subject to the obligations and
the restrictions set forth in the Advisers Act, the SEC proposed
retaining the exemption for brokers from the definition of
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 61,227.
Id. at 61,228.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2) (2013).
See id.
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investment adviser, notwithstanding that the broker was now
receiving what might otherwise be considered special
compensation for advice.113 The SEC focused on the services
provided by the broker rather than the form of the broker’s
compensation. In 2005, the SEC adopted Rule 202(a)(11)-1(a),
which stated that brokers would not be required to treat
customers as advisory customers provided the firm met the
following conditions:
(i) Any investment advice it provides to an account must be
solely incidental to the brokerage services provided to the
account (and thus must be provided on a non-discretionary
basis); and (ii) advertisements for and contracts, agreements,
applications and other forms governing its accounts must
include a prominent statement that the account is a brokerage
account and not an advisory account, and that the brokerdealer’s interests may not always be the same as the
customer’s.114

Under Rule 202(a)(11)-1(b), “a broker-dealer will not be
considered to have received special compensation solely because
the broker-dealer charges one customer a commission, mark-up,
mark-down or similar fee for brokerage services that is greater
than or less than one it charges another customer.”115
Not long after Rule 202(a)(11)-1 was adopted, it was
challenged in court. In 2007, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit rejected the SEC’s power to adopt such a rule.116 As
discussed above, the Advisers Act already exempted brokers from
the definition of investment adviser so long as the broker did not
receive special compensation for giving advice.117 However, the
Advisers Act contained a broader provision, which vested the
SEC with power to exempt “other persons” from the definition of
investment adviser.118 The court found that the adoption of Rule

113
Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Release No.
34-42099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1845, 64 Fed. Reg. 61,226-01, at
61,229 (proposed Nov. 10, 1999).
114
Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Investment Advisers, Release No.
34-51523, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424-01, at
20,434 (Apr. 19, 2005).
115
Id. at 20,436.
116
Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
117
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012).
118
At the time, § 202(a)(11)(F) of the Advisers Act exempted from the definition
of investment adviser “such other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as
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202(a)(11)-1 was the SEC’s attempt to expand the exemption for
brokers by utilizing its broad power to exempt “other persons.”119
Because Congress had already provided for an express exemption
for brokers, the SEC could not also exempt them as “other
persons.”
Therefore, the rule was inconsistent with the
legislative intent behind the Advisers Act.120
Once the rule was invalidated, brokers would not be able to
continue to offer clients a variety of fee structures unless they
also registered as investment advisers. At the time of the court
decision, the SEC estimated that investors held $300 billion in
one million fee-based brokerage accounts with brokers.121 The
brokers and the customers had to decide if they wanted to change
the fee structure of the account so that the broker could continue
to manage it. If the client wanted to continue to maintain a feebased account, the brokers would have to register as investment
advisers. Accordingly, the SEC sought some time, before the
court’s decision would become effective, “to protect the interests
of those customers and to provide sufficient time for them and
their brokers to discuss, make, and implement informed
decisions about the assets in the affected accounts.”122
As a result of the court’s decision, a number of brokers
registered as investment advisers.
As of late 2010,
approximately eighteen percent of all brokerage firms registered
with FINRA were also registered as investment advisers, and
approximately thirty-seven percent of FINRA registered
the Commission may designate by rules and regulations or order.” 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(11)(H) (originally 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(F)).
119
Fin. Planning Ass’n, 482 F.3d at 487–90.
120
The court held that the final rule adopted by the SEC was inconsistent with
the Advisers Act
because it fail[ed] to meet either of the two requirements for an exemption
under subsection (F). First, the legislative “intent” [did] not support an
exemption for broker-dealers broader than the exemption set forth in the
text of subsection (C); therefore, the final rule [did] not meet the statutory
requirement that exemptions under subsection (F) be consistent with the
“intent” of paragraph 11 of section 202(a). Second, because broker-dealers
[were] already expressly addressed in subsection (C), they [were] not “other
persons” under subsection (F); therefore the SEC [could] use its authority
under subsection (F) to establish new, broader exemptions for brokerdealers.
Id. at 488.
121
Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients,
Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2653, 91 SEC Docket 1915, 2007 WL 2778648,
at *5 (Sept. 24, 2007).
122
Id. at *2.
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brokerage firms had an investment adviser affiliate.123 These
firms offer clients a variety of services. As a result, clients may
end up having several different types of accounts with the firm
and may receive advice from “dual-hatted” personnel who are
both brokers and investment advisers.124 The individual will be
subject to either brokerage firm regulation or investment adviser
regulation based on the services offered.125
The SEC remained concerned that dual registration would
impact brokers’ ability to offer a full range of investment options
to their clients because of the restrictions on principal trading.
The SEC adopted temporary rule 206(3)-3T, which offered an
alternative means for investment advisers who were also brokers
to meet the disclosure and consent requirements of section 206(3)
of the Advisers Act when they act in a principal capacity in
transactions with certain of their advisory clients.126 The rule
allows investment advisers to orally disclose the fact that they
are acting in a principal capacity, rather than in writing, so long
as certain other conditions are met.127 Theoretically, this rule
provides more flexibility to investment advisers who are also
brokers in terms of the way they do business with their clients.

123

SEC STUDY, supra note 18, at 12.
Id. at 13.
125
Id.
126
Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients,
2007 WL 2778648, at *5–6.
127
Id. at *5.
124
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IV. LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS
Between 2007 and 2009, there was significant upheaval in
the financial services industry128 and the market declined
considerably.129 The country was embroiled in a financial crisis
that was deemed the worst crisis since the Great Depression.130
As a result, Congress considered necessary changes to the
regulations governing the financial services industry. The DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act131 was
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. The
purpose of Dodd-Frank was “[t]o promote the financial stability

128
In June 2007, two major Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed. See Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Two Former Bear Stearns Hedge
Fund Managers with Fraud (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2008/2008-115.htm. In February 2008, the auction rate securities markets
failed. See Auction Rate Securities Market: A Review of Problems and Potential
Resolutions Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 9 (2008) (statement of
Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, United States
Securities and Exchange Commission). In March 2008, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
acquired The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. See Press Release, J.P. Morgan Chase &
Co., J.P. Morgan Chase to Acquire Bear Stearns (Mar. 16, 2008), available at
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=299805.
In September 2008, Bank of America Corp. acquired Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., AIG
was bailed out by the U.S. government, and Lehman Bros. Inc. filed bankruptcy. See
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Reserve Bd. (Sept. 16,
2008),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/
20080916a.htm; Press Release, Bank of Am., Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch
Creating Unique Financial Services Firm (Sept. 15, 2008), available at
http://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/press-release/corporate-and-financial-news/b
ank-america-buys-merrill-lynch-creating-unique-financial; Press Release, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, Statement Regarding Recent Market Events and Lehman
Brothers (Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008198.htm. In December 2008, the SEC charged Bernard L. Madoff with a multimillion dollar ponzi scheme, and Wells Fargo & Co. merged with Wachovia Corp. See
News Release, Wells Fargo & Co., Wells Fargo and Wachovia Merger Completed
(Jan. 1, 2009), available at https://www.wellsfargo.com/press/2009/20090101_Wacho
via_Merger; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Bernard L.
Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme (Dec. 11, 2008), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-293.htm.
129
Between October 2007 and March 2009, the DOW Jones Industrial Average
dropped by more than fifty percent of its value. See Peter A. McKay, Dow Is Off
7,401.24 Points From Its Record High in ‘07, WALL ST. J. (March 3, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123599406229708501.html.
130
THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xv (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
131
See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for
other purposes.”132
The law as enacted was a compromise between the House
and the Senate versions. Both the House and the Senate
versions addressed changes to the standards of conduct
applicable to brokers and investment advisers.133 “The House
approach was to harmonize the fiduciary standard for brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers. The Senate approach was to
have the SEC conduct a study to evaluate the effectiveness of
existing standards of conduct for brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers . . . .”134
Section 913 of Dodd-Frank is entitled, “Study and
Rulemaking Regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and
Investment Advisors.”135 Pursuant to subsection (b), the SEC is
required to conduct a study to evaluate:
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of
care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons
associated with brokers or dealers, and persons associated with
investment advisers for providing personalized investment
advice and recommendations about securities to retail
customers imposed by the Commission and a national securities
association, and other Federal and State legal or regulatory
standards; and
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of
retail customers relating to the standards of care for brokers,
dealers, investment advisers, persons associated with brokers or
dealers, and persons associated with investment advisers for
providing personalized investment advice about securities to
retail customers that should be addressed by rule or statute.136

132

Id. at pmbl.
MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND
INVESTMENT ADVISERS 5 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R41381.pdf.
134
Id. (footnote omitted).
135
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform And Consumer Protection Act § 913.
136
Id. § 913(b).
133
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Section 913 sets forth fourteen items that the SEC was to
consider when conducting the study and includes a catchall of
anything not explicitly set forth that the SEC deems necessary
and appropriate.137
A.

The SEC Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers

Over the next several months, the SEC conducted the study
as required by Dodd-Frank. The SEC issued its report, the
“Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers” (the
“Study”), to Congress in January 2011.138 The Study examined
the fourteen different items, as directed by Dodd-Frank.139 It
examined the current landscape of regulation of both brokers and
investment advisers and the perceptions of investors.140 It made
a number of recommendations, most notably to harmonize the
standards of care applicable to brokers and investment
advisers.141
As discussed in further detail below, this
recommendation is inadequate to address investors’ confusion
over the responsibilities and obligations of the person with whom
they are investing because it does not create an ongoing fiduciary
duty on the part of brokers.
The Study recognized the differences in the regulatory
framework for investment advisers and brokers. As discussed
above, the main difference in the standard of conduct between
the two is that investment advisers are held to a fiduciary duty
and brokers generally are not.
The fiduciary duty of an
investment adviser includes both the duty of loyalty as well as
the duty of care. On the other hand, the law and custom
applicable to brokers is based on fairness. “Actions taken by the
broker-dealer that are not fair to the customer must be disclosed
in order to make this implied representation of fairness not
misleading.”142 The Study described the limited instances in
which courts will find that brokers are subject to the fiduciary
duty: “Generally, courts have held that broker-dealers that
exercise discretion or control over customer assets, or have a

137
138
139
140
141
142

Id. § 913(c).
See generally SEC STUDY, supra note 18.
Id. at 1.
See id. at 5–101.
See id. at 108–10.
Id. at 51.
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relationship of trust and confidence with their customers, owe
customers a fiduciary duty.”143 However, there is no federal
fiduciary duty created by the 1934 Act.
According to the Study, the extent of the broker’s duties
stems from the nature of the relationship with the investor. For
example, addressing conflict of interest disclosures, the Study
noted that if the broker processes orders but does not recommend
securities or solicit customers, the material information to be
disclosed is narrow and relates only to the consummation of the
transaction.144
Such a broker would not have to disclose
information about the security or its own economic self-interest
in the transaction.145 But, if the broker recommends a security, it
must “give honest and complete information” and must disclose
“material adverse facts of which it is aware.”146 Generally
speaking, when recommending a security, the broker must
disclose its own economic interests in the trade, such as whether
it will be acting as a principal, third-party compensation paid,
whether there is revenue sharing for a mutual fund, and the
expenses related to the class of security offered.147 The Study
concluded that such disclosure “allows customers to verify the
terms of their transactions and provides disclosure on potential
conflicts of interest.”148
In addition to making certain disclosures when completing
transactions, a broker also has a duty to ensure that any
recommendation he makes to a client is suitable. The Study
addressed what it deems three approaches to suitability under
common law: reasonable basis suitability, customer specific
suitability, and quantitative suitability.149 Under the first, the
broker must have investigated the security and have adequate
information concerning the security recommended.150 Under the
second, the broker must make inquiry concerning the investor
and make a recommendation based on the investor’s response.151
Under the third, a broker that maintains actual or de facto
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 55–56.
See id. at 57.
See id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 63–64.
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control over an investor’s account is required to have a basis to
believe the amount of trading in the investor’s account is
suitable.152 This obligation to ensure that a recommendation is
suitable for the investor is explicit in the FINRA Rules.153
The Study also examined several sources of information
regarding investor perception of a broker’s duties, concluding
that investors were confused about the distinctions between
brokers and investment advisers.154 Through comments the SEC
publicly solicited, many investors stated that they did not
understand the standards of care applicable to investment
advisers and brokers, found the standards of care confusing, and
were uncertain about the meaning of the multiple titles used by
investment advisers and brokers.155 Siegel & Gale, LLC and Gelb
Consulting Group, Inc. were retained by the SEC in 2004 to
conduct focus group testing.156 The focus group participants
raised the same issues as those raised by investors in the
publicly solicited comments, namely that they did not understand
that the roles and legal obligations of investment advisers and
brokers are different and that the different titles used are
confusing.157 The participants also did not understand terms
such as “fiduciary.”158
In 2006, the SEC retained RAND Corporation (“RAND”) to
conduct a study of brokers and investment advisers.159 RAND
noted that it could be difficult for investors to understand the
differences in the services provided by financial firms as the
information was not presented uniformly.160 For example, some
firms provided so much information to investors that it would be
difficult for the investors to process it all, and other firms
provided scant information to investors.161 RAND also found that
the firms believed investors tend to trust a particular firm
without necessarily understanding the firm’s services and
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responsibilities.162 RAND came to the conclusion that the
“financial services market had become more complex over the
last few decades in response to market demands for new products
and services and the regulatory environment.”163
The SEC also considered a survey conducted by industry
advocates and certain industry groups.164 The results of that
survey again suggested that investors do not understand the
differences between investment advisers and brokers, nor do they
understand that there are differing standards of conduct related
to each.165
Overall, the Study found that, based on these comments,
studies, and surveys, investors do not understand the differences
between investment advisers and brokers.
This lack of
understanding is compounded by the fact that many investors
may not have the “sophistication, information, or access needed
to represent themselves effectively in today’s market and to
pursue their financial goals.”166 The Study concluded that
it is important that retail investors be protected uniformly when
receiving personalized investment advice or recommendations
about securities regardless of whether they choose to work with
an investment adviser or a broker-dealer. It also is important
that the personalized securities advice to retail investors be
given in their best interests, without regard to the financial or
other interest of the financial professional, in accordance with a
fiduciary standard.167

As discussed above, the purpose of conducting the Study was
to determine whether there were inadequacies within the
standards of care applicable to brokers and investment advisers.
Based on the information gathered in the Study, the SEC staff
made the following key recommendation with respect to
standardizing the conduct of brokers and investment advisers:
The Commission should engage in rulemaking to implement the
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and
investment advisers when providing personalized investment
advice about securities to retail customers. Specifically, the
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Staff recommends that the uniform fiduciary standard of
conduct established by the Commission should provide that:
[T]he standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers, when providing personalized investment
advice about securities to retail customers (and such other
customers as the Commission may by rule provide), shall be to
act in the best interest of the customer without regard to the
financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment
adviser providing the advice.168

The Study explained that the duties of loyalty and care that
are encompassed in the standard of care owed by investment
advisers must be included in this uniform fiduciary duty.169 The
duty of loyalty is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary standard
under the Advisers Act.170 To comply with the duty of loyalty,
brokers would have to eliminate or disclose material conflicts of
interest.171 Commission-based compensation does not violate the
fiduciary standard.172 Nor does the fiduciary standard require
that a broker have a continuing duty of care or loyalty after the
investment advice has been given.173 This is a key departure
from the standard of care applicable to investment advisers. The
fiduciary duty described by the case law discussed above
presumes that the investment adviser will provide advice on an
ongoing basis. However, the recommendation made within the
Study specifically states that it would not require brokers to
provide ongoing advice.174
The Study expected that the uniform fiduciary standard
would overlay the existing investment adviser and broker
regimes to supplement, not supplant, them.175 It balanced
concerns about the impact of regulatory change on investor
access to low-cost products and services by not per se eliminating
particular products, services, or compensation schemes.176 The
Study did not discuss how the absence of an ongoing duty to
provide advice would address the confusion on the part of
investors over the differences between brokers and investment
168
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advisers. Although the Study termed it a “uniform” duty, there
remain clear distinctions between the duty as it will apply to
brokers and investment advisers.
In its guidance, Congress directed the SEC as to which
sections of the Advisers Act the SEC should look to incorporate
when considering the standards of care applicable to brokers and
investment advisers. Section 913(g) of Dodd-Frank required the
SEC to consider a fiduciary standard no less stringent than
sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act; however, it omitted
206(3), which refers to principal trading.177 This is the same
section of the Advisers Act that the SEC modified through the
temporary rule adoption. The Study recognized that principal
trading has the potential for raising conflicts of interest.178 The
Study recommended that, at a minimum, under a uniform
fiduciary standard, a broker should disclose its conflicts of
interest, but it would not necessarily need to follow the same
specific notice and consent requirements of the Advisers Act.179
This would allow brokers to continue to engage in principal
trading without having to go through the same disclosure and
consent requirements to which an investment adviser must
adhere. The Study recognized that brokers would remain subject
to the obligations which are set forth through the FINRA rules,
including those related to suitability, best execution, and fair and
reasonable pricing and compensation when engaging in principal
trading.180
Notwithstanding the recommendations made by the SEC
staff, it has not yet issued any new rules or regulations on this
topic.
V.

MOVING FORWARD

In 1934, Congress recognized that it could not remain
inactive while the securities markets changed around it. In
2010, following the second major financial crisis, Congress once
again attempted to address concerns regarding the regulation of
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the financial services industry. It is clear that the brokers and
investment advisers of today are not the brokers and investment
counselors of the 1920s and 1930s. The legislation coming out of
the Great Depression was aimed at addressing the concerns of
the time. With respect to brokers, these concerns were focused
on firms extending credit in an imprudent manner. There was
some recognition of the need for disclosure, especially when
brokers were acting for their own accounts in addition to their
customers’ accounts. However, a broker was not the person to
whom an investor went for broad advice. That role was played by
investment counselors. Congress recognized at the time that
investment counselors were primarily used by individuals with
larger accounts, who were looking for personalized investment
advice. Investment counselors themselves expected that they
should be acting at all times in their clients’ best interest. They
expected that they should be segregated from incentives that
might put their own interests ahead of their clients.
Over time, the relationship between investors and financial
professionals has changed. More and more investors do not even
realize that there is a distinction between brokers and
investment advisers. While some may assert that this is an issue
of investor education, it is more of an issue of how brokers and
investment advisers are holding themselves out to the public.
The SEC recognized the increase in overlap between brokers and
investment advisers when it sought to exempt brokers who
offered fee-based accounts from the Advisers Act’s coverage.
Although the exemption was overturned by the D.C. Circuit
Court, the result was not clarity for investors. Instead, many
brokers registered as investment advisers so that they could
continue to offer flexible fee structures for their clients.
As the studies have shown, investors do not understand the
different roles brokers and investment advisers play, nor do they
understand the different regulatory structures governing each.
As explained by the Treasury Department:
Retail investors are often confused about the differences
between investment advisers and broker-dealers. Meanwhile,
the distinction is no longer meaningful between a disinterested
investment advisor and a broker who acts as an agent for an
investor; the current laws and regulations are based on
antiquated distinctions between the two types of financial
professionals that date back to the early 20th century. Brokers
are allowed to give “incidental advice” in the course of their
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business, and yet retail investors rely on a trusted relationship
that is often not matched by the legal responsibility of the
securities broker. In general, a broker-dealer’s relationship
with a customer is not legally a fiduciary relationship, while an
investment adviser is legally its customer’s fiduciary.
From the vantage point of the retail customer, however, an
investment adviser and a broker-dealer providing “incidental
advice” appear in all respects identical. In the retail context,
the legal distinction between the two is no longer meaningful.
Retail customers repose the same degree of trust in their
brokers as they do in investment advisers, but the legal
responsibilities of the intermediaries may not be the same. 181

Brokers have infiltrated the investment adviser world. The
same individual may act as both a broker and an investment
adviser for the same client, albeit with respect to different
accounts. At the time the SEC conducted its Study in 2010,
approximately eighty-eight percent of investment adviser
representatives were also registered as brokers with FINRA.182
The benefit they offer to clients is most clearly evidenced by the
flexibility in compensation structures they are able to offer their
clients. If a client just wants trade execution, he can use a
discount broker, which may involve the client placing trades
himself through an online account. This tends to be the cheapest
means of utilizing the services of a broker. If a client wants more
advice, he can utilize the services of full-service broker, who will
be bound by FINRA’s suitability rules and offer advice as
appropriate on a transaction-by-transaction basis. If the client
wants full service, including monitoring of his accounts between
transactions, he can utilize the advisory services of the firm and
be charged an annual fee which is based on the net assets in the
account. Theoretically, a larger account would need more
oversight, justifying higher fees. It is unrealistic to expect that
brokers will give up these options to once again fit into the role
envisioned when the 1934 Act was adopted. It is unlikely that
investors would want this as well. One must believe that, at
least on some level, the supply of various levels of service flowed
from an expressed demand for such variety.
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However, simply because the services offered by brokers now
overlap with the role of investment advisers in some
circumstances does not mean the Advisers Act should apply to
brokers. There are certainly situations in which it would be
appropriate to subject brokers to the obligations set forth in the
Advisers Act. However, without a private right of action, the
added protection to investors would be minimal.
What is needed is a new regulatory scheme, which
recognizes the differing levels of services offered to clients by
brokers and investment advisers, namely, a Financial Advice Act.
The proposed legislation would apply to both investment advisers
and brokers, thereby eliminating the false distinction between
the two. The duties applicable to the financial professional would
vary based on the services being offered and the prices being paid
by the investors, not on the fee structure of the account. The
proposed legislation must include both a duty of loyalty and a
duty of care, which apply to all accounts, regardless of the fees
paid. The duties may be limited in time when the account is a
trading account, where the investor seeks no advice, but the
duties should be ongoing when the investor does seek advice
about investing. It seems counterintuitive that an investor
would seek advice concerning what to purchase and when, but
should not expect advice about when to sell the investment. The
proposed legislation should recognize the position of trust
financial professionals hold and should cover acts of negligence
as well as fraud, as the Advisers Act has done.
Investors should retain the ability to choose how they want
to interact with their financial professionals. The proposed
legislation should aim at providing investors protection against
unscrupulous investment “professionals” who seek to earn a
profit at the detriment of their clients. However, the proposed
legislation must allow legitimate financial professionals to do
business. Investors should be provided with disclosures that
outline the legislative protections they will receive with each
level of service. However, if a financial professional acts as if the
investor belongs to a higher category of service, the investor
should be provided the heightened protections afforded to
investors in that higher category. There should be explicit
guidance within the proposed legislation about which sorts of
conflicts must be avoided and which may be disclosed. The
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proposed legislation should contain an express private right of
action, firmly establishing a federal scheme of investor
protection.
While investor education is an important component to an
effective regulatory scheme, it should not be the key component.
Investors should not be relegated to the atmosphere of caveat
emptor that existed prior to the enactment of federal securities
legislation.
CONCLUSION
The current regulatory scheme governing brokers and
investment advisers has not accounted for the changes in the
professions over the past ninety years. At the time the 1934 Act
and the Advisers Act were enacted, there were clear distinctions
between brokers and investment advisers. Those distinctions no
longer exist. Accordingly, the regulations governing each must
be truly harmonized. The most effective way to create a
harmonized standard of care is to create new legislation that
recognizes that the existing distinctions are false.
To do
otherwise will perpetuate the false distinctions to the disservice
of the investing public.

